Bangladesh is no stranger to political contestation. But the turbulence unfolding over the past year – marked by Sheikh Hasina’s death sentence, the banning of the Awami League from electoral participation, mass detentions,and the re-entry of groups once marginal in mainstream politics – signals something far deeper than a change in government.
It reveals what happens when institutions begin to bend under the weight of political conflict, and shows how easily a political system can drift once the balance between authority and accountability slips.
The dramatic exit of Hasina’s government was not just the end of a long political chapter. It was the collapse of a governing model built on centralized executive authority. For more than a decade, Bangladesh’s political landscape revolved around a single pole, the Awami League and its command over bureaucracy, policing and the development networks.
Critics accused the government of constraining dissent. Supporters countered that stability was necessary to deliver growth. Both may be right in parts, but the more pressing question is what happens when such a pole is suddenly removed.
The past few months have given us that answer: institutions do not automatically rebalance themselves. They scramble to locate new centers of gravity.
This sudden vacuum exposed the degree to which the political field had narrowed. In many democracies, the presence of multiple competitive actors cushions transitions. Bangladesh, however, had seen its political architecture centered more and more around a single party and a single leadership.
When that structure was withdrawn, the system lacked intermediate stabilizers. Bureaucratic branches that once aligned themselves to a clear authority began looking for new political signals. Civil society networks, once constrained, found space but not necessarily direction. And, most importantly, the absence of a dominant party opened the gates for forces that had patiently waited at the margins.
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Institutional drift and the rise of hardline actorsInto that vacuum have stepped actors who, until recently, operated on the fringes of national politics. In the most visible resurgence, Jamaat-e-Islami and its student organization, the Islami Chhatra Shibir, have rapidly expanded their street presence since August 2024.
Shibir processions in Chittagong, Rajshahi and Sylhet areas, once sporadic, have become frequent and far more assertive, often projecting the marchers as defenders of “Islamic order” and “moral justice.”
Alongside them, groups such as Hefazat-e-Islam, local clerical networks, and district-level Islamist coalitions have quietly consolidated influence, stepping into a political space that mainstream parties are no longer allowed to occupy.
Hardline factions thrive in precisely these moments of institutional disruption. They mobilize faster than conventional parties, distribute narratives more sharply and often move through decentralized, mosque-linked networks that require little formal organization.
Their recent public marches, whether framed around anti-corruption rhetoric, economic grievances or religious identity, have filled the streets not because they reflect majority sentiment but because there are few alternative political platforms left standing.
The announcement of elections under Muhammad Yunus was meant to signal a return to constitutional order. But the exclusion of the Awami League, the country’s largest political organization with deep rural and urban networks, has left the electoral field hollow. Without the Awami League, the political contest becomes unanchored, allowing smaller but highly motivated groups to dominate narratives. Elections held under such conditions, risk becoming symbolic exercises: procedurally valid but substantively disconnected from the country’s political reality.
In this fluid environment, groups with ideological discipline, especially those tied to religious networks, gain disproportionate influence. Jamaat-linked organizations have reopened offices that were shut for years; Islamic Shibir cadres are reportedly reactivating campus units; and smaller Islamist fronts have begun negotiating coalitions ahead of the election. These are not isolated incidents but indicators of a political system whose center has collapsed, leaving the loudest and best-organized actors to fill the void.
Rebuilding democracy, not just holding electionsNone of this absolves the previous government of excesses. The crackdowns on student protests, the shrinking media freedoms and the use of state power against opposition voices were deeply damaging to the country’s political fabric.
But the current moment shows that the corrective to over-centralization cannot be abrupt removal. Institutional transitions are stable only when they preserve the basic competitive architecture of politics. By eliminating the Awami League from the contest entirely, the system has inadvertently empowered precisely those groups that have a past record of organized violence against minority groups and harboring internationally designated terror groups.
Bangladesh’s challenge now is not simply to replace one governing party with another. It must restore the legitimacy of political competition itself. Elections that appear procedurally correct but substantively hollow will only deepen the fractures that have emerged. A system in which mainstream parties cannot contest; dissent is framed through ideological extremes, and institutions appear reactive rather than impartial cannot sustain long-term stability.
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Rebuilding this competitive field requires more than administrative fixes. It demands recognition that democratic resilience is rooted in predictability. Citizens must believe that rules do not change with political winds. Parties must trust that institutions will not be weaponized against them. And state actors must internalize that their role is to serve the system, not the incumbent of the moment.
Bangladesh’s crisis demonstrates what happens when institutions become accustomed to following personalities rather than procedures. When the personality exits, uncertainty takes over. The stabilizing pillars of governance, courts, oversight agencies, and law enforcement find themselves navigating ambiguity without clear norms. That is why the present moment feels both politically charged and structurally fragile.
Bangladesh stands today at a point where its next choices will shape its politics for generations to come. The challenge is not simply to hold an election, but to rebuild a level playing field where every major and minor party can compete; ideological extremes are constrained by rules and norms, and state institutions are not instruments of political convenience. For a country that has achieved remarkable economic gains over the past decade, the risks of institutional drift are too high to ignore.
Tarun Agarwal is an Associate Fellow at the Center of Policy Research and Governance, New Delhi, where he leads the climate-conflict division. He has submitted his PhD dissertation at the Diplomacy and Disarmament Division of the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.
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